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CYBERSPACE AND PERSONAL
JURISDICTION: THE PROBLEM OF USING
INTERNET CONTACTS TO ESTABLISH
MINIMUM CONTACTS
I. INTRODUCrION
Electronic communication threatens the modem conception of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, as defined by the
United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton' and its progeny. Every day many people communicate via some
form of electronic media, usually a computer, to send electronic mail
(e-mail), visit Internet newsgroups, or "surf" the World Wide Web.
Each of these activities could potentially become the basis for assert-
ing personal jurisdiction in a distant forum. This Comment explores
the extent to which courts should use these electronic contacts to as-
sert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
Although cyberspace has now become part of the common ver-
nacular, synonymous with electronic entities such as the Internet and
the World Wide Web,2 few who use the term can explain what the
word precisely means.3 Even the man who coined the term, science
fiction author William Gibson, has difficulty defining it; cyberspace is
"[s]omeplace that you can't see but you know is there."4 Yet, the
term has attained such exalted pop culture status that it has spawned
new derivative terms: cyberchat, cyberphobia, cybersex.5
Cyberspace, in a nutshell, describes a world of electronic com-
munication through the use of computer connections.6 The recent
rapid increase in the number of these transmissions and connections
has afforded people greater accessibility to more efficient means of
communication and information exchange than the traditional meth-
ods of telephone and mail provided in the past. The ubiquity of
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Welcome to Cyberspace: What Is It? Where Is
It? And How Do We Get There?, TIME, Mar. 22, 1995, at 4.
3. See id.
4. Id. at 6.
5. See id. at8.
6. See id.
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computer technology has forced society to depend increasingly on the
electronic contacts that form the foundation of cyberspace., This
growth has raised novel legal issues concerning the implication of
electronic contacts. One such issue involves the potential use of
these contacts to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants.
Recently, two separate courts analyzed this issue and reached
seemingly contradictory' results. In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.
King," the Southern District of New York held that the court could
not assert personal jurisdiction over a Missouri defendant who had
created a home page on the World Wide Web.9 Ten days later, in
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,' the Central District of
California found that it retained personal jurisdiction over an Illinois
resident who had allegedly violated the plaintiff's trademarks by us-
ing them to register Internet domain names."
This Comment examines the reasoning set forth in both Bensu-
san and Panavision to analyze the application of the rules of personal
jurisdiction to the world of cyberspace. Part II traces the develop-
ment of the various entities that constitute cyberspace, the Internet
and the World Wide Web in particular, to acquaint the reader with
the relevant terms and concepts. Part III briefly summarizes general
principles of personal jurisdiction. Part IV and Part V review the
decisions in Bensusan and Panavision. Part VI attempts to reconcile
the apparent conflicts between these two decisions and offers a
modified approach based on the "effects test" of Calder v. Jones" for
courts confronting this issue in the future.
II. WHAT IS CYBERSPACE?
In 1984 William Gibson coined the term "cyberspace" to de-
scribe generically the "geographically nonexistent space where com-
7. People rarely fail to encounter some form of computer-based communi-
cation device on a daily basis. Pagers that transmit messages to their owners
from another source can arguably become the centerpiece of a future lawsuit.
People can access the World Wide Web, send e-mail, and download vast
amounts of information from the convenience of their own homes. Many multi-
national corporations currently utilize internal e-mail systems to link their branch
offices around the world. In addition, companies have begun to recognize new
business opportunities available through the Internet. See Philip Elmer-DeWitt,
Will Gates Get the Net?, TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 79.
8. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
9. See id. at 300.
10. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
11. See id at 622.
12. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
January 1998] CYBERSPACE AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 693
puter-aided communication takes place[,]' 3 as well as the "realm and
cultural dynamics of people and machines working within the con-
fines of computer-based networks.,
14
During the 1992 presidential campaign, President Clinton and
Vice President Gore helped to popularize another term that also de-
scribes cyberspace: "Information Superhighway."15 Most people are
unaware, however, that "there really is no such thing. But it sounds
big and exciting and like something the government should pour lots
of dollars into, so the metaphor survives."16 Although the term cy-
berspace did not first appear until 1984, the interconnected network
of computers that it describes existed long before anyone had an of-
ficial name for it.
A. The Internet
Through the overuse of references to cyberspace by media and
society, 17 the term has mistakenly become synonymous with the In-
ternet, an entity that has its origins in the 1960s." Many people use
the names interchangeably without realizing that, in fact, the two
words describe separate concepts. The Internet more accurately de-
scribes one aspect of the larger world of cyberspace.2 People can
connect two or more computers together into a network, allowing the
computers and their users to share information and communicate
with one another.2 ' Thousands of these networks connect to each
13. DINTY W. MOORE, THE EMPEROR'S VIRTUAL CLOTHES: THE NAKED
TRUTH ABOUT INTERNET CULTURE 209 (1995); see WILLIAM GIBSON,
NEUROMANCER 4 (1984).
14. G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET 331
(1995).
15. See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 2, at 4; see also MOORE, supra note 13, at 1
("No one is even sure who first used [the term Information Superhighway,]
though many people have accused Vice President Al Gore.").
16. MOORE, supra note 13, at 213.
17. See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 14, at 331 (Cyberspace has become "[a]n
entirely meaningless buzzword that might have been related to the Gibson term,
once, but has since been sucked into the reality distortion field that surrounds
Hollywood, Madison Avenue, and pop culture.").
18. See id at 31.
19. Cf. Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 2, at 4.
20. Cyberspace also encompasses internal electronic mail networks, which
are not connected to the Internet, where users can exchange messages with one
another but cannot connect to other networks. Cf id. ("By 1989 [cyberspace]
had been borrowed by the online community to describe not some science-fiction
fantasy but today's increasingly interconnected computer systems--especially the
millions of computers jacked into the Internet.").
21. See MOORE, supra note 13, at 213.
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other to create one huge international "Network of Networks,"" the
Internet.
The United States Department of Defense in 1969 created the
forerunner to the Internet, ARPAnet, as an experiment to develop
computer network technologies that could survive partial power out-
ages.n A power outage could disable portions of a network for an
unspecified amount of time. The government, therefore, wanted to
build a system that could ensure the delivery of information from a
source computer to its destination,' a concept known as "dynamic re-
routing."'' The resulting effort, ARPAnet, consisted of a system
which linked each computer to multiple computers, safeguarding the
uninterrupted flow of information.2' The Internet retained this inter-
grated structure, which replaced the central hub model, "ensur[ing]
that the network isn't vulnerable to a simple break in the chain."2
7
Currently, the Internet connects hundreds of thousands of uni-
versities, government agencies, and corporations around the world.
Users can access it from their offices, classrooms, homes and from
the road.2 The Internet recently underwent an explosive growth pe-
riod with the number of host computers and users doubling every
year between 1983 and 1994.9
In order to access the Internet, a potential user has two options."
A person can use a computer connected directly to the Internet, such
as a workplace terminal that is part of a network connected to the In-
ternet. In this case, the computer will also serve as an Internet host,
with its own electronic address.3 2 Alternatively, a person can use a
computer that connects to an Internet service provider, such as
America Online, the Microsoft Network, or Prodigy.3 The computer
22 Id
23. See ALLIsON, supra note 14, at 31.
24. See id.
25. JOHN R LEVINE & CAROL BAROUDI, THE INTERNET FOR DUMMIES 12
(1993).
26. See ALLISON, supra note 14, at 31.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 19.
29. See id.; see also LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 25, at 7, 8 (estimating
that by 1994, approximately 1000 new networks and 100,000 users joined the In-
ternet each month); MOORE, supra note 13, at xiv (predicting that by 2003, every
person on the planet will have network access).
30. See HARLEY HAHN & RICK STOUT, THE COMPLETE INTERNET
REFERENCE 34 (1994).
31. See id at 35.
32. See id.
33. See LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 25, at 16-17.
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connects, via modem and telephone lines, with the service provider's
network computer, essentially providing an "on-ramp" onto the Su-
perhighway.m
The most interesting aspect:of the Internet, aside from the vast
amounts of information available to users, concerns the fact that no
single person or entity assumes responsibility for overseeing and op-
erating it;35 in effect, "no one is in charge."3" Although the National
Science Foundation, an agency of the United States Government,
operates and funds a substantial portion of the Internet's
"backbone," 37 the Internet's fundamental lack of structure causes its
inherent disorganization!'
B. The World Wide Web
A researcher in Geneva, Switzerland created the World Wide
Web (the Web), the "multimedia branch of the Internet," in 1990.9
The Web "radically differ[s] [from other components of the Internet]
because it uses hypertext and graphics together to display informa-
tion, allowing users to cross the globe with a single click of the
mouse.
" 40
34. See id.
35. In The Lawyer's Guide to the Internet, G. Burgess Allison compares the
operation of the Internet to faxing. No one stands in charge of faxing; nor does
anyone own it. Yet people still fax effectively in the absence of supervision over
this mode of communication. In order to fax, people purchase their own equip-
ment and pay for the telephone charges they incur. People must also rely on
suppliers of basic services, such as the telephone companies. See ALLISON, supra
note 14, at 30.
36. Id. at 19.
37. See id. at 32.
38. See id at 20.
39. KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE:
THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET 257 (1996).
40. DAVID M. CHANDLER Er AL., RUNNING A PERFECT WEB SITE 9 (1995).
"Hypertext is data that contains links to other data." HAHN & STOUT, supra note
30, 496. In an encyclopedia, hypertext's closest non-technical analogy, an article
on "Trees" might end with, "For related information, see Plants." This cross-
reference represents a link. Id.
In a hypertext article about trees on the Web, the creator can create ad-
ditional links each time the author mentions a new tree. See id. The creator of
the Web page often highlights or underlines the links so that they stand out to
readers. See id. By clicking the mouse on a link to a specific tree, the reader can
jump to an article about that particular type of tree. See id.
As one court noted, "a user can move seamlessly between documents, re-
gardless of their location; when a user viewing the document located on one
server selects a link to a document located elsewhere, the [computer] will auto-
matically contact the second server and display the document." Shea v. Reno,
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The Swiss creators originally developed the Web to enable
physicists from around the world to share their research and infor-
mation.4' Businesses, however, have rapidly commercialized the
Web, exploiting it as a means to market and sell their products and
services.42
Because a person can access a vast variety of information from
numerous sites, the Web requires a system that catalogues the infor-
mation for easy retrieval.43 Uniform Resource Locators (URLs),4
930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Links can also connect to full articles on related topics, such as "wood" or"paper" or to portions of articles defining technical terms, such as "coniferous,"
See id. Furthermore, links no longer refer simply to text. Web site creators in-
creasingly utilize the multimedia facet of the Web to incorporate links to photo-
graphs, graphics, video, and sound. See id.
41. See HAHN & STOUT, supra note 30, at 497.
42. See BILLY BARRON ET AL., THE INTERNET UNLEASHED 35 (2d ed. 1995);
see also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
43. See PAUL GILSTER, FINDING IT ON THE INTERNET 143 (1994).
44. The URL describes the type of resource involved as well as the address of
that resource. See id. at 144. All URLs consist of multiple parts, separated by
periods, with each part resembling a word. See id. (providing a listing of URLs
which show a variety of Internet files). For example, Loyola Law School main-
tains a home page on the Web at "http://www.law.mu.edu." See Anton Mack,
Loyola Leads the Way on the World Wide Web, Loy. LAW., Spring-Summer
1997, at 8. This site contains an index of links to available information, including
career services and admissions. See id.
The vast majority of addresses on the Web begin with "http://www." The
"http" (HyperText Transfer Protocol) designation signifies a hypertext document
while "www" indicates a location on the Web. See GILSTER, supra note 43, at
144.
The actual address of the document or site, in this case "law," which is a
server on the larger "lmu" server, follows "www." See CHANDLER ET AL., supra
note 40, at 244. The last part of the address, which can consist of two or three
letters, "edu" above, signifies the zone. See LEVINE & BAROUDI, supra note 25,
at 59. In the United States, most World Wide Web sites rest in three-letter
zones, as defined by the entity creating the site. See id. The most commonly
used zones include "edu" for educational institutions, "coin" for commercial or-
ganizations, "gov" for government bodies and departments and "org" for organi-
zations which do not fall under any of the other categories, such as professional
societies like the American Bar Association. See id.
This complicated scheme can create problems and confusion. For an ex-
ample of the importance of precision when identifying a URL, see Cornelia
Grumman, Dole Error Hurts Web Site Plug; Deleted 'Dot' Sends Some into Cy-
berether, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 1996, at 19. During the 1996 campaign, Republican
presidential nominee Bob Dole bungled an attempt to advertise his Web home
page, www.dolekemp96.org, when he left out the last "dot," stating the address
as www.dolekemp96org. See id. Those who followed Dole's directions received
a "try again" message. See id. Others who tinkered with the address by adding a
dot or a hyphen, could have landed on the Clinton-Gore campaign Web site. See
id. An imposter Dole Web site, http:llwww.dole-kemp.org, sent unknowing us-
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serve as "addresses" that specify the exact location of information
not only on the Web, but also on the entire Internet.45
In order to place hypertext documents on the Internet, an indi-
vidual must first create a Web home page.4' After completing the
page in a hypertext format on a home computer, the author uploads
the information onto leased space on an existing network server.47 As
long as the server remains online, anyone with access to the Internet
can contact the home page.
Most importantly, the creator must select an appropriate name
for the address to ensure that people can easily remember the URL
and readily find the page.4 The federal government funds Network
Solutions Inc., whose InterNIC division, holds responsibility for as-
signing, registering and regulating domain names.49 By the end of
July 1996, InterNIC had registered nearly 500,000 domain names,
nearly a ten-fold increase from the 52,500 existing in March 199520
C. Distinctive Cyberspace Culture
The Internet can attribute its rapid growth and popularity to the
"enormous sense of community and cooperation that characterizes""
its "grass roots structure., 52 The Internet remains open and demo-
ers to http://www.cg96.org, the President's campaign Web site. See id.
45. See GILSTER, supra note 43, at 144.
46. See CHANDLER ET AL., supra note 40, at 40. A network server is a com-
puter dedicated to providing information to any of the computers that connect to
it. See ALLISON, supra note 14, at 330.
47. See CHANDLER ET AL., supra note 40, at 40, 164.
48. See id. at 183.
49. See Kara Swisher, More Protection Due for Addresses on the Internet; Of-
ficial Registry Seeks to Avoid Involvement in Trademark Fights, WASH. POST,
July 27, 1995, at B9.
50. See Evan Ramstad, Cyberspace's Hated Cop, BUFF. NEws, Sept. 9, 1996,
at A9. Until recently, InterNIC did not adhere to traditional trademark princi-
ples when registering new domain names. As a result, the first to register a do-
main name was the "first in right." See James A. Powers, Web Names May Lead
to Legal Trouble, INTERACrIvE MKTG. NEWS, Feb. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL
7819865. This practice, of course, constituted "competitive poaching," an abuse
of the system whereby an entity purposely registered a name to exploit that
name's association with a company or brand name. See id. For example, Pepsi
would engage in competitive poaching if it were to register "coke.com." See id.;
see also discussion infra Part IV. Individuals who engage in competitive poach-
ing purely for personal profit also become commonly known as "cyber squat-
ters." See Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N:D. Ili. 1996)
(citing Greg Miller, Cyber Squatters Give Carl's Jr., Others Net Loss, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 1996, (Orange County ed.) at Al).
51. See ALLISON, supra note 14, at 35.
52. See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 2, at 4, 9.
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cratic; no single entity owns or controls it.53 Two basic principles
which guide the Internet include freedom of speech and self-
determination.'
1. Freedom of speech
Freedom of speech offers protection to participants to discuss
and express their opinions candidly, as they would in public.5
Internet users generally treat anything one places on the Internet or
Web as public domain; if users can obtain an electronic copy of an
item, they will likely redistribute that image or information over the
Internet without regard to copyright or intellectual property rights.56
Fair use on the Internet "goes a long, long way."'
53. See id. However, new commercial forces seeking a foothold in the Inter-
net threaten this democracy. See, e.g., Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 7, at 79
(detailing Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates's attempt to control the Internet);
Brent Schlender, Whose Internet Is It, Anyway?, FORTUNE, Dec. 11, 1995, at 120
(describing the efforts of large technology companies like IBM, AT&T, Micro-
soft and Hewlett-Packard to take advantage of the Internet's rise).
Companies use the Internet, and in particular the multimedia capabilities
of the World Wide Web, to transact business. Companies, in their print advertis-
ing, commonly suggest readers to visit their Web pages for additional informa-
tion about their products. See Advertisement for Honda, SPORTS ILL., Sept. 29,
1997, at 58; Advertisement for Sony, GQ, Oct. 1997, at 303; In-Site, GQ, Oct.
1997, at 117 (providing a directory of corporate Internet addresses). People who
actually visit the sites experience color photos, sound and perhaps even a short
video clip, all featuring various products. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, After Net Prof-
its; Companies Are Dropping Catalogs and Using the Internet to Solicit Business,
but They Still Must Rely on Some Traditional Methods, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
Sept. 9, 1996, at Business 19 (describing how small companies utilize the Internet
as a retail channel to compete with larger companies); Jo Mancuso, Mining the
Net for Gold, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 8, 1996, (Magazine) at 10 (comparing people
seeking to exploit the Internet for profit to the gold prospectors who invaded
California in the 1840s and 1850s).
In addition, banking companies are rapidly perfecting the use of
"cybercash," a method of banking based on the popular European debit card sys-
tem and recently introduced in the United States. Although many regard the
commercialization of the Internet as inevitable, purists still hope to reverse this
trend. See Daniel Akst, In Cyberspace Nobody Can Hear You Write a Check,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, (Magazine) at 20. See generally Louise McElvogue,
Subtracting Ads; Web User Develops Program to Delete Unwanted Commercials,
L.A. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at D2 (chronicling the work of four college students
to create software that would allow its users to block advertisements on the
Web).
54. See ALLISON, supra note 14, at 36-42.
55. See id. at 37.
56. See id.
57. Id. Users' placement of information and images on the Internet raises
obvious intellectual property issues that recent courts have struggled to reconcile.
January 1998] CYBERSPACE AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 699
Of course, drawbacks also accompany this freedom. Since re-
sponsibility for editing the content or format of sites rests on no one
individual, the Internet contains material that many would regard as
foolish, tasteless, and inappropriate. 8
2. Self-determination
The freedom of speech recognized on the Internet does not
prove absolute; the principle of self-determination-the right of in-
dividuals to choose what they want to see and experience-tempers
its influence.59 Inappropriate comments, postings and messages vio-
late another's right to self-determination.'
When freedom of speech and self-determination clash, the In-
ternet culture favors a person's right to choose. While Internet deni-
zens exercise control over what they will and will not see,6 no estab-
lished system enforces this ethical code of conduct.6'
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL JURISDICrTION
A court must have jurisdiction over the persons or entities in-
volved in the action to hear a case properly.6 The Constitution
defines the outermost limits of a court's jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents of the state in which the court sits.6' The state may further limit
that scope statutorily.65 A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a
58. See Elmer-DeWitt, supra note 2, at 4, 10.
59. See ALLIsON, supra note 14, at 39-42.
60. See id. at 39-40.
61. See id. at 41.
62. See id. at 41-42. The notorious "Green Card" incident exemplifies the in-
ability of enforcing these rules. Two Arizona lawyers, a husband and wife,
posted an advertisement for their immigration-related legal services-helping
people obtain green cards-in several thousand newsgroups through an Internet
service called Usenet.
The couple violated unofficial "netiquette" by interrupting legitimate on-
line discussions with an off-topic posting. No Internet user subscribing to that
newsgroup could avoid the posting of this commercial advertisement, exacerbat-
ing this breach of protocol. In fact, many people encountered the same posting
several times.
Despite their breach of netiquette, the couple had no remorse. They re-
peated this technique on more than one occasion and even offered to teach oth-
ers the same. See id. at 40-41.
63. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.1, at 94 (2d ed.
1993).
64. See id.
65. See id. A court cannot assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident de-
fendant without a state long-arm statute authorizing the courts of that state to
assert personal jurisdiction. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.12, at
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party unless it possesses authorization under both the Constitution
and applicable state statutes."
Initially, courts based personal jurisdiction on the presence of
the person or thing involved in the lawsuit within the territorial
boundaries of the forum or the consent of the parties.67 Modern de-
cisions, beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in International
Shoe v. Washington,' have created exceptions to this restrictive con-
cept of jurisdiction to permit courts to assert jurisdiction over non-
resident individuals and entities after reviewing the relationship
among the place where the underlying transaction occurred, the par-
ties, and the state of the court hearing the lawsuit.69
A. The Basic Rule of International Shoe
In 1945, the Supreme Court, faced with an emerging postwar so-
ciety, adopted a more flexible standard for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction to address the practices of an increasingly mobile postwar
society."
The Supreme Court upheld the Washington state court's asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction over International Shoe, a company in-
corporated in Delaware and with its principal place of business in
Missouri.7 The Court's opinion established what still remains the
basic standard for determining whether a state may constitutionally
subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of its courts:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defen-
dant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice."7
141. A court can assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant under
a long-arm statute only after the plaintiff demonstrates the following: 1) the
statute's language applies to the cause of action alleged; 2) the court's exercise of
jurisdiction will satisfy the judicially developed standards that have emerged un-
der the statute; and 3) the court's exercise of jurisdiction complies with federal,
and any applicable state, constitutional standards. See id.
66. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 63, § 3.1, at 94.
67. See id.; see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877) (approving
the assertion of personal jurisdiction based on the territorial concept, the prede-
cessor to physical presence in the forum).
68. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
69. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.1, at 95.
70. See id. § 3.10, at 120.
71. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
72. See id. at 316.
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This test focuses on whether "subjecting a particular defendant
to jurisdiction in a particular case meets the demands of due proc-
ess."'  The requirements for determining whether a defendant shares
minimum contacts with a forum to permit the assertion of personal
jurisdiction depend upon "the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws." 74
B. Refinements to the Basic Rule of International Shoe
After International Shoe the Supreme Court refined the "fair
play and substantial justice" formulation that courts should apply to
measure minimum contacts.75 In Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson,76 however, the Supreme Court explicitly divided the "fair
play and substantial justice" standard into a two-pronged test.' The
threshold question still centers on whether the defendant has estab-
lished minimum contacts with the forum state. Only after a court
finds minimum contacts "among the parties and the forum do fair
play and substantial justice become relevant considerations. 7 8
1. Minimum contacts analysis
An analysis of whether a defendant has established minimum
contacts with a forum begins with two questions: (1) Whether the de-
fendant's activities in the forum were continuous and systematic or
only sporadic and casual, and (2) whether or not the cause of action
arises from the defendant's activities in the forum.79
a. general jurisdiction versus specific jurisdiction
The Supreme Court explicitly recognized the distinction between
"general jurisdiction" and "specific jurisdiction" in Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall.'o A court will inquire into the na-
ture of the activity and the relation of the cause of action to that ac-
tivity to determine whether general or specific jurisdiction applies.
73. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 121.
74. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
75. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 122 n.9.
76. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
77. See id. at 291-92; see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
7& See FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 122 n.9.
79. See id. at 122.
80. 466 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1984).
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General jurisdiction exists when the defendant has maintained sub-
stantial forum-related activity.81 If the nature of the defendant's ac-
tivities reaches a continuous and systematic level, a court can prop-
erly hear any cause of action, even one not arising out of the
defendant's forum-related activities.2
If a defendant's contacts with a forum constitute sporadic or cas-
ual activities, a court must assert specific jurisdiction over causes of
action arising out of those contacts." Specific jurisdiction can exist
even if defendant's contacts only prove minimal, such as an insurance
contractY'
b. purposeful availment
Although the application of minimum contacts can result in
nearly unlimited jurisdictional scope, the Supreme Court still recog-
nizes the relevancy of territorial limits on state court power:
[It is a mistake to assume that [the International Shoe]
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the
81. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, §3.10, at 125. In Helicopteros,
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death suit in Texas against a Colombian corpora-
tion and other defendants after one of the corporation's helicopters crashed in
Peru. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410. The plaintiffs argued that the court had
general jurisdiction over the defendants at trial. See id. at 415. Because the Su-
preme Court may only address the issues raised at trial, the Court had to treat
this case as one requiring general jurisdiction. See id. at 416. After characteriz-
ing a trip by the chief executive officer to Texas as sporadic, see id. at 415, and
the corporation's acceptance of checks drawn on a Texas bank as "negligible,"
see id. at 416, the Court turned its attention to the corporation's regular purchase
of helicopters from Bell Helicopters in Texas and the training of the corpora-
tion's pilots and management personnel by Bell in Texas. See id. at 418. The
Court held that the purchases alone did not warrant the assertion of personal ju-
risdiction over the nonresident corporation for a cause of action which does not
arise from the purchases themselves. See id. Furthermore, the Court also char-
acterized the training sessions in Texas as part of "the package of goods and
services purchased" and not a significant contact on which to base jurisdiction.
See id. The failure of the Helicopteros Court to consider the contacts in the ag-
gregate rather than separately "suggests very strongly that the threshold contacts
required for general jurisdiction are very substantial, indeed." See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 125.
82 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, §3.10, at 122-23. In Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), the Court upheld the as-
sertion of a Ohio court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the
cause of action did not arise from the defendant's forum activities.
83. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 124.
84. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (upholding
jurisdiction in a breach of contact action over a nonresident defendant whose
only contacts with California involved its issuance of an insurance policy to a
California resident and its receipt of premium payments from the insured).
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personal jurisdiction of state courts. Those restrictions are
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or
distant litigation. They are the consequence of territorial
limitations on the power of the respective States. However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a de-
fendant may not be called upon to'do so unless he has
"minimum contacts" with that State that are the prerequi-
site to its exercise of power over him.8s
Thirteen years after International Shoe, the Court in Hanson v.
Denckla6 held that "it is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefilly avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws." The Court upheld the argument
that "unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State."" Requiring purposeful conduct by the defendant
85. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (citations omitted); see supra
note 67 and accompanying text.
86. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In this case, Dora Donner, a Pennsylvania domicili-
ary executed a trust instrument in Delaware in 1935, granting her the power of
appointment as to the remainder in the trust and naming a Delaware bank as the
trustee. See id. at 238. Nine years later, Donner moved to Florida, where she
died in 1952. See id. at 239. Before her death, Donner purportedly exercised her
power of appointment to appoint a substantial portion of her trust to two other
trusts she had previously established with another Delaware trustee for two of
her grandchildren. See id. After Donner's death, the residual legatees filed an
action in Florida challenging Donner's exercise of the power of appointment and
claiming that the $400,000 amount in question had passed to them along with the
residue of Donner's estate. See id. at 238. The Florida Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, upheld the lower court's determination
that Donner ineffectively exercised her power of appointment under Florida law,
and awarded the money to the legatees. See id. at 242. However, before the
Florida trial court issued its judgment, the executrix of Donner's estate instituted
a declaratory judgment action in Delaware to determine who could claim the
trust assets. See id. The Delaware court held the trust and the exercise of the
power of appointment valid, refusing to give full faith and credit to the Florida
judgment after determining the Florida court had no jurisdiction over the trustee.
See id. at 243. The Supreme Court held that the Delaware trustee had not estab-
lished minimum contacts with Florida. See id. at 251. The trustee did not have
an office in Florida, did not solicit or transact business there, and did not hold or
administer any of the trust's assets there. See id. The Court also held that the
cause of action in the Florida suit did not "arise[] out of an act done or transac-
tion consummated in the forum State." Id.
87. Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
88. Id.; see also Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 86, 97 (1978) (holding that
a father's mere act of sending his daughter to live with her mother did not mani-
fest the intent to obtain nor the expectation to receive a corresponding benefit in
the mother's state.)
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protects the defendant's liberty interests and simultaneously requires
states to recognize the "coequal sovereignty of its sister states.""
2. Reasonableness
Even if the defendant has established minimum contacts with the
forum state, a court must determine whether it may reasonably the
assert jurisdiction over the nonresident. 9 The Court must balance
several factors including "the interests of the forum State, and the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief" against the "burden on the de-
fendant."'" The Court suggested, however, that this analysis weighs
more heavily in a lawsuit involving international defendants such as
Asahi as opposed to suits involving nonresident, domestic defen-
dants.'
IV. BENSUSAN RESTAURANT CORPORATION V. KING93
A. The Facts
The plaintiff, Bensusan Restaurant Corporation ("Bensusan"), a
New York corporation, founded the world-famous New York City
jazz club, The Blue Note.94 Bensusan owns all rights, title and interest
in and to the federally registered trademark "The Blue Note."95 De-
fendant King, an individual, owns and operates a small music club in
Columbia, Missouri, called "The Blue Note."96
In April 1996, King created a World Wide Web site to promote
his clubY This site, located on a computer server in Missouri, alleg-
edly contained a distinctive logo substantially similar to Bensusan's."
The Web site provided unrestricted access to any Internet user and
did not require any type of authentication or password for entry." At
this Web site, visitors could obtain general and ticket information
about the Missouri club, such as names and addresses of local Co-
lumbia ticket outlets and a telephone number for charge-by-phone
89. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.11, at 133.
90. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987).
91. See id.
92. See id, at 116.
93. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
94. See id. at 297.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id
9& See id.
99. See id.
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ticket orders.YO
At the time of the lawsuit, the first page of the Web site included
a disclaimer: "The Blue Note's Cyberspot should not be confused
with one of the world's finest jazz club[s] [the] Blue Note, located in
the heart of New York's Greenwich Village. If you should find your-
self in the big apple, give them a visit."'O' In addition, the disclaimer
also contained a hyperlink allowing users to connect directly with the
Bensusan Web site simply by clicking on the link.' 2 After Bensusan
objected to King's Web site, King eliminated both the final sentence
of the disclaimer and the hyperlink.ya
Bensusan brought this lawsuit in federal district court, asserting
claims for trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair
competition." King moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2).' 5
B. The Analysis
In considering King's motion to dismiss, the court framed the is-
sue as follows: "[W]hether the existence of a 'site' on the World
Wide Web of the Internet, without anything more, is sufficient to vest
this Court with personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to New
York's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution." '' The court specifically applied subdivisions
(a)(2) and (a)(3)(ii) 17 of New York's long-arm statute to determine
proper jurisdiction under the state statute.' 0
1. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 302 (a)(2)
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (N.Y. C.P.L.R.)
302(a)(2) permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over any
non-domiciliary who "commits a tortious act within the state" as long
as the cause of action arises from the tortious act."l The court relied
on the Second Circuit's requirement that a trademark infringement
100. See id-
101. Id. at 297-98 (quoting Complaint 9) (alterations in original).
102 See id. at 298.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297.
107. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2), (a)(3)(iii) (Consol. 1994).
108. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299-300.
109. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2).
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occur at the location "where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the de-
ceived customer buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is
buying the plaintiff's."'11 Under this standard, the sole act of offering
a single infringing copy of the trademarked product for sale in New
York, would vest a court with jurisdiction over the accused, even if
the accused failed to complete the transaction.' Therefore, an addi-
tional issue under this subdivision of the statute involves whether
"the creation of a Web site, which exists either in Missouri or in cy-
berspace-i.e., anywhere the Internet exists-with a telephone num-
ber to order the allegedly infringing [tickets], is an offer to sell the
product in New York."1
2
The court conceded that a New York resident could gain access
to the Web site and view the information concerning The Blue Note
Club in Missouri, either with knowledge of King's Web site address
or with a search engine capable of locating the site.' Nonetheless,
the court concluded that, even viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the allegations could not support the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction because a New York resident would have to take
several affirmative steps to access the Web site and use the informa-
tion there.1 In other words, the infringement in such a situation oc-
curs in Missouri, not New York.
5
Under the reasoning of the court, users must initially access the
Web site using their own computer."6 The court next reasoned that if
users wanted to attend a show at the defendant's club, they would
have to telephone the box office in Missouri and reserve tickets."'
Lastly, users would need to pick up their tickets in Missouri because
King does not mail or otherwise transmit tickets to buyers."'
Even assuming that the user was confused about the rela-
tionship of the Missouri club to the one in New York, such
an act of infringement would have occurred in Missouri, not
New York. The mere fact that a person can gain informa-
tion on the allegedly infringing product is not the equivalent
110. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 299 (quoting Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton
Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956)).
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
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of a person advertising, promoting, selling or otherwise
making an effort to target its product in New York. 9
Therefore, the court concluded that it could not exercise jurisdiction
over King under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2)Y'
2. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 302(a)(3)(ii)
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3)(ii) grants a court personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary who commits tortious acts committed out-
side the state that cause injury in the state if the non-domiciliary
"expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or interna-
tional commerce."' 2'
Bensusan did not allege that King derived substantial revenue
from interstate or international commerce." Instead, it alleged that
King participated in interstate commerce by hiring and showcasing
bands of national stature.Y' Section 302 (a)(3)(ii), however, explicitly
requires "substantial revenue" from interstate or international com-
merce.'24 As such, the court rejected Bensusan's assertion because lo-
cal Columbia residents accounted for ninety-nine percent of King's
revenues.Y2
The plaintiff also offered the following argument for personal
jurisdiction under 302(a)(3)(ii). An Internet subscriber can access
King's Web site from New York, as-well as from anywhere else in the
world. The defendant should therefore have foreseen that a person
in New York could view his site. King should thus have taken pre-
cautionary steps to restrict access to his Web site to users within a
specified geographic area, presumably Missouri, if he did not want to
risk exposure to out-of-state litigationY6 Under 302(a)(3)(ii), a de-
fendant must make "'a discernible effort.., to serve, directly or indi-
rectly, a market in the forum state.""' "[M]ere foreseeability of an
in-state consequence and a failure to avert that consequence is not
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).
122. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
123. See id.
124. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3)(ii).
125. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300.
126. See id.
127. Id. (quoting Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 831, 834
(App. Div. 1980)).
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sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. ' ' The court, premising
its holding on the standard above, found in favor of the defendant. 9
3. Due process analysis
The court properly recognized that constitutional due process
requires "the nonresident defendant [to have] purposefully estab-
lished 'minimum contact' with the forum state such that the
'maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice...'.' This standard incorporates the fol-
lowing factors:
(1) whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of
the benefits of the forum state; (2) whether the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there; and (3) whether the defendant carries on a continu-
ous and systematic part of its general business within the fo-
rum state.1
3 1
The court focused on the first factor in its analysis and con-
cluded that King did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of
New York because "King, like numerous others, simply created a
Web site and permitted anyone who could find it to access it.' 3 2 The
court analogized the creation of a Web site to placing a product into
the stream of commerce. Although King's creation of the home
page allows him to reach Internet users "nationwide . . . without
more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state.""'n
Bensusan did not allege that King encouraged New Yorkers to
access the site or that King conducted any business in New York.'35
Moreover, Bensusan did not allege that King had sustained any pres-
ence in New York other than the Web site. "6 Therefore, the court
suggests that, even if King had satisfied the first prong, purposeful
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Id (quoting Darby v. Compagnie Nacionale Air France, 769 F. Supp.
1255, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310,316 (1945))).
131. Id. at 300-01 (quoting Independent Nat'l Distribs., Inc. v. Black Rain
Communications, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 8464, 1995 WL 571449, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 1995)).
132. Id. at 301.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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availment, he probably did not satisfy either of the remaining two
prongs.137 King did not maintain a sufficient connection to the forum
state to foster reasonable expectations of defending a lawsuit in New
York court, and he did not conduct continuous and systematic busi-
ness in New York.3 '
Finally, the court distinguished this case from CompuServe, Inc.
v. Patterson,'39 where the Sixth Circuit held personal jurisdiction over
defendants proper. In CompuServe, an Internet user domiciled in
Texas specifically targeted Ohio by subscribing to CompuServe, an
Ohio-based Internet service provider, and by entering into a separate
agreement with the company to sell his software over the Internet.'
44
Furthermore, the user advertised his product over the Internet and
repeatedly shipped the software to CompuServe in Ohio.1'4 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that Patterson had "reached out" from Texas to
Ohio and "originated and maintained" contacts with Ohio.'42 How-
ever, the court explicitly refrained from addressing the issue of
whether the user "would be subject to suit in any state where his
software was purchased or used."' 43
In contrast, the Bensusan court held that, unlike the user in
CompuServe, King had not directed any contact toward or shared any
contact with New York.'" As a result, the court granted King's mo-
tion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).' 4'
V. PANA VISION INTERNATIONAL, L.P. v. TOEPPEN4'
On September 19, 1996, ten days after the Bensusan decision, a
federal court in the Central District of California applied the Cali-
fornia long-arm statute to assert personal jurisdiction over an Illinois
resident and a District of Columbia corporation.47
A. The Facts
Panavision International, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
with its principal place of business in Los Angeles, owns several
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
140. See id. at 1264.
141. See id. at 1264-65.
142. See id. at 1266.
143. IL at 1268 (emphasis omitted).
144. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
145. See id.
146. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
147. See id. at 618.
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federally-registered trademarks, including "Panavision" and
"Panaflex," for its motion picture and television camera and photo-
graphic equipment business."M Panavision filed a suit against Dennis
Toeppen, an individual residing in Illinois and operating several Web
sites, including the two at issue in the case, "panavision.com" and
"panaflex.com."' 49 In addition, Panavision also named Network So-
lutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a District of Columbia corporation maintaining
its principal place of business in Herndon, Virginia." Panavision al-
leged various federal and state causes of action against both defen-
dants in this case.'
Anyone who wishes to create a Web site must apply for use of a
domain name through NSI, the only entity in the world responsible
for accurately registering all Internet URLs 52 NSI does not sepa-
rately inquire into an applicant's right to enlist a particular domain
name.53 Since at least November 1995, NSI has required applicants
to offer the following representations and warranties,
(1) that the applicant's statements in the application are true
and the applicant has the right to use the requested domain
name; (2) that the use or registration of the domain name
does not interfere with or infringe the rights of any third
party with respect to trademark, service mark, trade name,
company name or any other intellectual property right; and
(3) that the applicant is not seeking to use the domain name
for any unlawful purpose,... or for the purpose of confus-
ing or misleading a person, whether natural or incorpo-
rated. L
Although Toeppen never obtained authorization to use the
Panavision trademarks, NSI registered the panavision.com domain
name to him.55 Toeppen's Web site displayed aerial photos of Pana,
Illinois. At no time did Toeppen use the site to sell any goods or
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. The claims included: "1) federal dilution of trademark; 2) state dilution
of trademark; 3) federal trademark infringement; 4) federal unfair competition;
5) unfair competition; 6) intentional interference with prospective economic ad-
vantage; 7) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and 8)
breach of contract. Id. at 619.
152 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
153. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
154. Id.
155. See id.
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services over the Internet.
156
Subsequently, Panavision attempted to establish a Web site un-
der its own name to transact business." Panavision, however,
learned it could not register its URL under its trademark after dis-
covering that Toeppen had already established that domain name.58
When Panavision notified Toeppen of its intent to use panavi-
sion.com, Toeppen demanded $13,000 in return for discontinuing use
of the Web site address.'59 Toeppen thereafter registered panaf-
lex.com as another domain name."W
Panavision also asserted that Toeppen registered additional do-
main names similar to other trademarked names, such as
"aircanada.com," "anaheimstadium.com," "camdenyards.com,"
"deltaairlines.com," "eddiebauer.com," "neimanmarcus.com," and
"northwestairlines.com.'.'. At the time of this suit, American Stan-
dard, Inc. and Intermatic, Inc. had already instituted trademark in-
fringement actions against Toeppen for registering
"americanstandard.com" and "intermatic.com" as Web site addresses
and subsequently demanding money for relinquishing control of the
names. 2 Panavision claimed that Toeppen registered its trademarks
solely to extort money from Panavision"
Toeppen filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing
that he lived in Illinois and that the allegations concerned his actions
in that state.' 64
B. The Analysis
California's long-arm statute permits its courts to assert jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident defendant "on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of [California] or of the United States."'65 There-
fore, a court must determine only whether personal jurisdiction in
this case comports with due process.'" In conducting its analysis, the
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1991).
166. See Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir.
1993) (quoting Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257,
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Panavision court focused primarily on specific jurisdiction,67 which
arises when a defendant's contacts with the forum state, though in-
sufficient to establish general jurisdiction, form the basis of the law-
suit."6 Specific jurisdiction may apply even if the defendant has never
physically entered in the forum state.
169
The Ninth Circuit has developed a three-part test to determine
whether specific jurisdiction exists:
(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or con-
summate some transaction with the forum or perform some
act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws[;] (2) [t]he claim must be
one which arises out of or results from the defendant's fo-
rum-related activities[; and](3) [e]xercise of jurisdiction
must be reasonable.Y7
1. Purposeful availment
The purposeful availment requirement protects nonresidents
from having to appear before a court to defend against actions based
on "'random, fortuitous or attenuated' contacts over which [they]
have no control.'' This prong of the test necessitates that "it must
1258 (9th Cir. 1989)). The California long-arm statute reaches the entire scope of
due process as it recognizes jurisdiction over nonresident to the extent permitted
under the United States Constitution. In contrast, the New York long-arm stat-
ute invoked in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), discussed supra Part III, places greater limitations on courts' ability seek-
ing to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents. All states, except California and
Rhode Island, have enacted this type of "tailored" long-arm statute. See JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.12, at 140.
167. Initially, the court did analyze whether it could assert general jurisdiction
over Toeppen. General jurisdiction exists when the defendant resides in the fo-
rum state or when the defendant conducts "substantial" or "continuous and sys-
tematic" activities there. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 620 (quoting Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)). Successfully
invoking general jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to pursue a cause of action unre-
lated to the defendant's continuous and systematic activities in the state. See id.
The court concluded that it lacked general jurisdiction as Toeppen lived in Illi-
nois and did not maintain systematic, continuous, or substantial contact with
California-he had only visited the state twice in 1996. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985).
170. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th
Cir. 1977)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
171. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 620 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at
475).
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be foreseeable that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum state are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."' However, the nature of this first
threshold will differ depending on whether the underlying cause of
action involves contract or tort principles.'73
The Panavision court, after concluding that "tort analysis
provid[ed] the proper analytical framework," adopted the "effects
test" 74 of Calder v. Jones75 to determine whether Toeppen purpose-
fully availed himself of the privilege of transacting business in Cali-
fornia. 6 This test contains three elements: 1) the act must be
intentional; 2) the act must be expressly aimed at the forum state;
and 3) the act must cause harm, "'the brunt of which is suffered-and
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum
state."'"7
Since Toeppen allegedly registered his domain names with both
the knowledge that they belonged to Panavision and the intent to in-
terfere with its business, the court found that Toeppen did aim his
conduct at California.7 8 Also, Toeppen knew that harm would likely
172. Id.
173. See id. For example, in a contract dispute, merely entering into an
agreement with a resident of the forum state does not suffice to establish specific
jurisdiction. See id. at 620-21. With tort actions, specific jurisdiction may be
proper under the "effects test." See id. at 621; infra notes 176-177 and accompa-
nying text.
174. See id.
175. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder, the Court found that California could ex-
ercise proper jurisdiction over a reporter and an editor, both residing in Florida,
for an allegedly defamatory article they had written and published in a national
magazine. See id at 784-85. The Court reasoned that "the focal point both of
the story and of the harm suffered" occurred in California. Id. at 789. The
plaintiffs fell victim to "intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions... expressly
aimed at California," not from untargeted negligence. Id. at 789-90. As a result,
the Court held that plaintiffs "injured in California need not go to Florida to seek
redress from [defendants who] knowingly cause... injury in California." Id. at
790.
176. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621. The court viewed Panavision's allegation
that Toeppen interfered with its prospective economic advantage as the underly-
ing claim, rendering Toeppen's action "more akin to a tort claim than a contract
claim." Id. (quoting Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir.
1995)). The court determined that Toeppen had not intended to compete with
Panavision. Instead Toeppen had hoped to act as a "spoiler," preventing Panav-
ision and similar corporations from conducting business over the Internet using
their own trademarks as their Web site addresses without paying him to discon-
tinue his exploitation of the same for his URLs. See id.
177. See id. (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486
(9th Cir. 1993)).
178. See id.
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occur there because Panavision's principal place of business, as well
as the heart of the motion picture and television camera equipment
industry rests in California.'79 Consequently, the court concluded that
Toeppen could not characterize his actions as random, fortuitous, or
attenuated; Toeppen purposefully availed himself of the benefits and
protections of California." °
The court carefully distinguished its holding from the results in
both Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. Kingl8' and CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson.'2 According to the Panavision court, "the issue in those
cases was whether contacts with the forum state via the Internet...
were sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction."'" While the Panavi-
sion court admitted that the case before it appeared similar to those
cases,' the court refused to hold that Toeppen had transacted busi-
ness in California via the Internet.' 85 Whereas the parties in both
Bensusan and CompuServe "had legitimate businesses and legitimate
legal disputes," Toeppen had only conducted "a scam directed at
California."'86
2. Arises out of or results from
The Panavision court, employing the Ninth Circuit's "but for"
analysis established in Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines,"" quickly dis-
posed of the "arises out of or results from" requirement.' Under
this standard, "if the plaintiff would not have suffered [a] loss 'but
for' the defendant's forum-related activities, courts [will] hold that
the claim arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities.' ' 89 In
this case, the court determined that "but for" Toeppen's prior regis-
tration, Panavision would have created its Web site using its trade-
mark as the domain name, thus avoiding harm.'
179. See id. at 621-22.
180. See id
181. See discussion infra Part III.
182 See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
183. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622.
184. See id
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990).
188. See id.
189. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622 (citing Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64
F.3d 470,474 (9th Cir. 1995)).
190. See id.
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3. Reasonableness
The final prong of the jurisdiction analysis ensures that a court's
"exercise of jurisdiction comport[s] with [traditional notions of] 'fair
play and substantial justice."'191 This determination requires a court
to balance the following factors:
(1) [T]he extent of defendant's "purposeful" interjection;
(2) the burden on defendant in defending in the forum; (3)
the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's
state; (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dis-
pute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the contro-
versy; (6) the importance of the forum to plaintiffs interest
in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an
alternative forum. 2
The court must weigh each of the seven factors; "no one factor is dis-
positive"'93 of reasonableness.
The Panavision court, however, did not conduct a balancing test.
Instead it relied on the holding in Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus-
tries... and pronounced that, in a tort action, when "a nonresident,
acting outside the state, intentionally causes injuries within the state,
local jurisdiction is presumptively not unreasonable."'95 The court
effectively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant to present a
compelling case demonstrating jurisdiction unreasonable under the
circumstances." 6
According to the court in Panavision, Toeppen did not establish
such a case."9 The court acknowledged the findings of other Ninth
Circuit courts stating that "'[i]n this era of fax machines and discount
air travel,' requiring Toeppen to litigate in California is not constitu-
tionally unreasonable." '198 The court concluded, without balancing the
seven Burger King factors that jurisdiction over Toeppen did not
191. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78
(1985)).
192- 1l (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476-77).
193. Id.
194. 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)
195. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp at 622 (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel In-
dus. AB, 11 F.3d. 1482, 1487 (1993)).
196. See Core-Vent, 11 F.3d at 1487.
197. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622.
198. Id. (quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also
California Software Inc. v. Reliability Research, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1356, 1364
(C.D. Cal. 1986) ("Modem means of communication and transportation have
tended to diminish the burden of defense of a lawsuit in a distant forum," quot-
ing Insurance Co. of North America v. Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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offend "fair play and substantial justice."'" Panavision could there-
fore litigate its claims in California.
VI. ANALYSIS
The Internet's potential to establish electronic contacts nation-
wide may unintentionally confer jurisdiction over Web site creators
upon courts in all fifty states. Permitting courts to assert personal ju-
risdiction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of these contacts
alone will encourage plaintiffs to seek the forum which has enacted
the most favorable laws.2
A court must examine whether its state's long-arm statute
authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident and also
whether the defendant's conduct satisfies the "minimum contacts"
requirement under the Due Process Clause before determining if ju-
risdiction properly exists."° This second question further subdivides
into three parts. First, the defendant must have purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of doing business in the state.' Second, if
asserting specific jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant's activities in the forum state.m Finally, the court's exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction must comport with "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.'" ' In assessing reasonableness,
the court usually weighs the defendant's burden of litigating in an-
other state, the interest of the forum state in applying its laws, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states
in securing the most efficient resolution.2
This traditional test for jurisdiction, however, has lost some of its
relevance in a world increasingly reliant on electronic modes of
communication. Courts facing these changing circumstances must
adapt and contemporize their former analytic approaches to
199. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622.
200. Forum shopping can offend notions of "fair play and substantial justice"
producing inequitable administration of the law. The plaintiff's choice of forum
may inconvenience the defendant to such a magnitude as to violate federal due
process. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) ("[J]urisd-
ictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to make litigation 'so gravely
difficult and inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in
comparision to his opponent.")
201. See FRIBDENTHAL ET AL, supra note 63, § 3.12, at 141.
202. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
203. See International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
204. Id.
205. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., plurality).
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accommodate modem society, much in the same way the Interna-
tional Shoe court confronted the evolving commercial realities of
postwar America.
One possible solution involves modifying the Calder v. Jones'
effects test to include not only intentional torts but also non-
intentional acts which the defendant should have known would cause
an effect in the forum state. Expanding the scope of the effects test
beyond merely intentional torts will not only protect the rights of
plaintiffs but also discourage forum shopping as well. The updated
effects test would allow increasing numbers of plaintiffs, not only
those asserting tort claims, to file suit in their home states without
appreciably circumscribing the rights of defendants. This modified
approach eliminates the role of fortune inherent in the analysis of the
Panavision court and represents an improvement over the reasoning
in both earlier cases.
A. Purposeful Availment Under the Modified Effects Test
The threshold question asks whether a user "contacts" the home
page in the creator's state or whether the home page makes "contact"
with the user in the user's state. In Bensusan, the court inappropri-
ately inferred that the user contacts the home page when it concluded
that King did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of con-
ducting business in New York.'
The Bensusan court suggested that because a New York resident
needed to "take[] several affirmative steps" to access the defendant's
Missouri home page, King did not satisfy the purposeful availment
prong of New York.2 The court heavily emphasized that King
earned ninety-nine percent of his revenue in Missouri in reaching its
decision.2w The absence of actual sales to New York residents
influenced the court to conclude that King did not purposefully avail
himself of the benefits and protections of the laws of New York.2 0
Several shortcomings plague the court's reasoning. Since a link
can connect a user to any number of other hypertext documents-
whose locations the user does not know-requiring users to learn
their exact location on the Internet at any given time constitutes an
206. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
207. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 298-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
208. See id at 299.
209. See id. at 300.
210. See id. at 301.
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unfair burden.
For example, a Californian may visit a jazz home page created in
Chicago containing links to biographies on different musicians. The
user could click on a link to a biography, created in New Orleans, of a
specific artist listing future show dates, including one at "The Blue
Note" in Missouri. The user then selects that performance and ar-
rives at the home page operated by the defendant in Bensusan. As-
suming this user joins the one percent of non-Missouri residents who
purchase tickets, a California court employing the Bensusan court's
reasoning would not take jurisdiction over King because he did not
purposefully avail himself of the forum state. If the purchaser resorts
to litigation to resolve a dispute with King over the tickets, the pur-
chaser must do so in Missouri.
In contrast, the Panavision court found purposeful availment
where the defendant maintained only electronic contacts with the fo-
rum state.21' Characterizing the defendant's actions as tortious in na-
ture, the court implemented the traditional "effects test" of Calder v.
Jones,212 to determine purposeful availment .
The assertion of personal jurisdiction should not hinge on the
ability of plaintiffs to allege a tort claim. Although the Supreme
Court restricted the holding of Calder v. Jones to intentional torts,24 a
trademark infringement action should qualify as well because the un-
derlying activities could substantially impact the forum state, either
through confusion, interference with prospective business, or the
mere fact that "[t]he registration of... trademarks as domain names
is valuable.., because it allows Internet users who are familiar with
the trademarks to easily search the Internet., 215 Potential defendants
whose acts create these possible "effects" can in many cases foresee
the harmful effects of their acts in a distant forum.
Revisiting the Bensusan facts, King knew that using "Blue Note"
and a logo susbstantially similar to Bensusan's as his Web site ad-
dress could potentially confuse Web browsers. Recognizing this,
King placed a disclaimer, "The Blue Note's Cyberspot should not be
211. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616, 620-22 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
212. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
213. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621. In addition, a plaintiff who success-
fully invokes this line of analysis avoids the issue of whether the defendant"plac[ed] a product into the stream of commerce," as discussed in Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 110.
214. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-91.
215. See Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 621.
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confused with one of the world's finest jazz club[s] [the] Blue Note,
located in the heart of New York's Greenwich Village,, 216 at the foot
of his home page. In addition, King created a hyperlink to the New
York Blue Note Web site, in an attempt to diminish any confusion
about the relationship between the two Web sites.217
An application of a modified effects test would have likely per-
mitted the Bensusan court to assert personal jurisdiction over King,
even in the absence of traditional contacts with New York, due to the
foreseeable nature of the possible effects resulting from the defen-
dant's act of creating the home page. By including the disclaimer, the
defendant clearly contemplated that users could confuse the Missouri
site with the New York site, potentially harming the plaintiff.
B. Reasonableness
218
The final obstacle to the assertion of personal jurisdiction, rea-
sonableness, consists of primarily four relevant factors.2 9 The court
must balance each of these factors to ensure that the exercise of ju-
risdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. ''us Neither the Bensusan nor Panavision court con-
ducted a fairness analysis on the record.
1. Burden on the defendant
Even under the proposed modified effects test applicable in non-
intentional tort settings, a court would require evidence suggesting
that defendants could have foreseen the harmful effects of their acts
to counter the impact of the potential burden on the defendant of
litigating in a distant forum. A demonstration of foreseeability en-
sures that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum
state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there."2'' An earlier satisfaction of the purposeful availment
prong, which already takes the defendant's burden into account,
216. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (alterations in origi-
nal).
217. See id. at 298.
218. I will only discuss the first and third prongs of the minimum contacts
analysis because courts generally do not have difficulty applying the second
prong, which analyzes the relationship of the cause of action to the defendant's
contacts.
219. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 125-27.
220. Id. at 125.
221. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300-01 (quoting Independent Nat'l Distrib.,
Inc. v. Black Rain Communications, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 8464, 1995 WL 571449, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1995)) (emphasis added).
720 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:691
diminishes the weight of this factor.
2. Interest of the forum state
Courts have recognized the interest of the forum state in adjudi-
cating a dispute between a state resident and a company doing busi-
ness in the state as another compelling factor in the reasonableness
analysis. 2 The forum state also maintains an interest in regulating
business activities involved in the suit and providing a convenient fo-
rum for its residents."* This factor plays a significant role when a
nonresident defendant creates harmful effects in the forum state.24
3. Interest of the plaintiff
Before reaching the reasonableness analysis, a court has already
determined that the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum.
The plaintiff, because it has chosen to file suit, maintains a strong in-
terest in adjudicating this claim. By selecting their own state of
residency, plaintiffs reinforce the state's interest in adjudicating the
claim and protecting the rights of its citizens, undermining a defen-
dant's argument toward unreasonableness.
Courts must examine a nonresident plaintiff's motives, however,
with a more skeptical eye to ensure that the plaintiff has not engaged
in forum shopping. If a plaintiff will undertake the burden, however
great or insignificant, of filing in a foreign state, the burden on the de-
fendant to litigate there increases proportionally because a defendant
may not reasonably expect to defend claims in a forum where the
plaintiff does not reside, especially if defendant did not foresee the
effects of the act in this forum.m This interest would weigh more fa-
vorably to the defendant if, for example, Panavision chose to file in
Texas, rather than California. Although Toeppen could have fore-
seen the effects in California, he could not reasonably expect to be
haled into the Texas courts. Moreover, if the plaintiff pursues litigation
222. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 63, § 3.10, at 126.
223. See id.
224. Although the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, restricts the ability
of plaintiffs to choose an unrelated, unconnected forum, proper venue may still
exist in the judicial district "in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred .... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1994).
The issue that then presents itself concerns the determination of whether
the claim arose in all 50 states simultaneously when the user posted the docu-
ment, and the definition of "substantial." This Comment will not address this
question because it focuses on personal jurisdiction, not venue.
225. Obviously, this would not be true if the plaintiff selects the defendant's
home state.
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out-of-state, the defendant's state may arguably represent the most
equitable forum. The interest of the defendant's home state in secur-
ing an efficient resolution of the dispute likely outweighs the interest
of any other state, except perhaps the plaintiff's state of residency, in
resolving the controversy.
4. The interest of other states in securing the most efficient
resolution of the controversies
Essentially, the parties' states of residence hold the greatest in-
terests in resolving the dispute. Any other state in which the plain-
tiff could file would likely prove too removed from the litigation to
render jurisdiction improper on fairness alone. Any state, other than
the parties' states of residency, will likely have a substantial interest
in refusing to hear the case because the lawsuit bears little relation to
that state. The courts in these other states should preserve their lim-
ited time and judicial resources.
VII. CONCLUSION
Electronic communication, the Internet (and its World Wide
Web service), and cyberspace in general present novel issues in the
area of personal jurisdiction. In the next few years, courts will define
the parameters of basing personal jurisdiction only on electronic
contacts. Recent decisions at the trial court level suggest that one
coherent approach will not likely win widespread approval until the
appellate courts render opinions.
Nonetheless, the approach of the court in Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King unnecessarily restricts the possible forums available to
plaintiffs to file suit for claims involving electronic contacts. While
the Panavision analysis grants wider latitude in forum selection, it re-
stricts this privilege to a particular class of cases.
An expansion of the effects test to include non-intentional acts
which have foreseeable effects in the forum state best solves this
problem. This model permits courts to confront the issue of elec-
tronic contacts without a massive overhaul of the existing jurisdic-
tional framework. In a majority of cases, adapting the effects test in
this manner will in practice grant plaintiffs the choice between in-
state courts or those in the defendant's home state. In most in-
stances, the modified test will preclude all other forums as unreason-
ableness. Easing the personal jurisdiction hurdles for plaintiffs filing
226. See supra Part VI.B.2.
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Internet-related lawsuits should not open the door to arbitrary forum
shopping in efforts to obtain a favorable result. Applying the effects
test to non-intentional tort, Internet-related lawsuits will achieve all
of these goals.
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